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ABSTRACT 
 
We present Risk Integrated's Enterprise Spreadsheet Platform (ESP), a technical approach to the 
near-elimination of spreadsheet risk in the enterprise computing environment, whilst maintaining 
the full flexibility of spreadsheets for modelling complex financial structures and processes. In its 
Basic Mode of use, the system comprises a secure and robust centralised spreadsheet management 
framework. In Advanced Mode, the system can be viewed as a robust computational framework 
whereby users can “submit jobs” to the spreadsheet, and retrieve the results from the 
computations, but with no direct access to the underlying spreadsheet. An example application, 
Monte Carlo simulation, is presented to highlight the benefits of this approach with regard to 
mitigating spreadsheet risk in complex, mission-critical, financial calculations. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Spreadsheet risk is the danger that errors in a common business tool such as Microsoft 
Excel can cause material losses when used inappropriately by financial organisations. 
Today most banks already have established sets of rules, standards, and controls over 
their accounting systems and many of the databases they access. However controls have 
not yet been put into place for their smaller systems such as spreadsheets. This lack of 
internal control and audit reporting is something now being addressed in response to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 banking regulation in the US [SOX], and the operational risk 
section of Basel II globally [Basel II]. 
 
The problem with spreadsheets is that they are being built, in general, by non-
programmers. Errors creep into formulas, some from formatting, and some from links to 
other spreadsheets. Most are due to negligence, although a few are due to fraud. There are 
no thorough procedures in place to check the accuracy of the spreadsheets, or to test 
multiple runs of data through them.  
 
The financial software industry has responded in a number of ways. For example, there 
are various spreadsheet auditing tools available that can assist in the process of building 
reliable spreadsheets; and there are tools available to help end-users build new 
spreadsheets from scratch in the most robust manner. Also, more comprehensive 
solutions for managing the use of spreadsheets are beginning to emerge in the 
marketplace. These so-called Business Intelligence (BI) platforms are aimed at delivering 
insight to managers from masses of quantitative data centrally-held in the enterprise. For 
example, Microsoft is reportedly working on a BI solution around a future release of their 
Excel spreadsheet product, due for release in 2007 [The Banker, 2006].  
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In Section 2, we present Risk Integrated's technical approach to the near-elimination of 
spreadsheet risk in the enterprise computing environment whilst maintaining the full 
flexibility of spreadsheets for modelling complex financial structures and processes. The 
approach is particularly suited to those applications where a common set of complex 
spreadsheet-based calculations has to be applied across multiple instances of data inputs 
e.g. individual deals within a portfolio, distributed across the enterprise, whilst retaining 
centrally-managed consistency and integrity throughout.  
 
By way of illustrative example, Section 3 discusses the application of the approach to the 
computationally-intensive process of Monte Carlo simulation for assessment of credit risk 
(another topical subject in the sphere of Basel II). 
 
Section 4 contains concluding remarks.  
 
2. RISK INTEGRATED’S ENTERPRISE SPREADSHEET PLATFORM 
 
2.1 “Basic Mode”: a secure spreadsheet management system 
 
As depicted in Figure 1, Risk Integrated’s Enterprise Spreadsheet Platform (ESP) 
represents a secure spreadsheet management framework whereby the spreadsheets 
themselves are exposed only to a select few designated experts ("superusers") in the 
organisation. These users have the responsibility for maintaining the integrity of the 
spreadsheet models, and for "uploading" their tested and "signed-off" versions to a 
centralised server/database.  ESP provides sophisticated tools that monitor, assign, and 
track changes to those spreadsheets.  A full audit trail is available for tracking the 
versioning of the spreadsheet models against those users submitting the changes, thereby 
eliminating that source of spreadsheet risk associated with the proliferation of un-
versioned models, scattered around the organization. 
 
The employment of ESP in the manner described, i.e. as a secure and robust spreadsheet 
management system, is considered the Basic Mode of ESP operation, and may be 
considered as comparable with the aims of the other emerging Business Intelligence 
platforms with regards securing access to spreadsheets. 
 
 
Figure 1. Risk Integrated’s Enterprise Spreadsheet Platform (ESP) architecture. 
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2.2 “Advanced Mode”: a secure & robust computational engine 
 
The full power of ESP is realised in the Advanced Mode of ESP operation whereby 
normal end-users (in contrast to superusers) can utilize a given spreadsheet model as a 
computational engine, but without having direct access to the underlying spreadsheet 
itself. The rationale here is that those users whose primary goal is to input data and make 
use of results of computations do not need access to the underlying spreadsheets. In other 
words, they can only submit "jobs", via their web-browser window, to a centralised 
cluster of computational servers, which, in turn, retrieve the spreadsheets via the 
management framework, automatically spawn service sessions of the underlying 
spreadsheet application, and "run" the computations against the "inputs" submitted by the 
end-users. The spreadsheets never reside on the end-user (client) machines and are never 
opened interactively by the end-users, thereby eliminating the major source of 
spreadsheet risk caused by end-users, namely, the introduction (inadvertently or 
otherwise) and propagation of errors within the core of the spreadsheets themselves. 
Depending on the specificity of the spreadsheet in question, the data submitted by the 
end-users via their web-browser can be pre-screened (before being sent to the 
computational servers) using field-wise validation technology built-in to the web 
application interface, thereby minimising another source of spreadsheet risk, namely 
"nonsense" data being fed to the computations. 
 
The results of the computations are time-stamped and archived in the central database 
(against the given set of end-user inputs and spreadsheet model version) for auditability 
and reporting, before being sent back to the end-users' browser for display. This 
minimises another source of spreadsheet risk, namely the manipulation of the results 
coming out of the spreadsheet calculations. 
 
2.3 Security layer 
 
The security of the ESP management framework leverages the authentication and 
authorisation layers inherent to the operating system and/or Relational Database 
Management System (RDBMS). ESP therefore allows for completely configurable user 
and group level security and permissions. 
 
2.4 User and Data Interfaces 
 
A possible criticism of the approach pertains to the perceived limited flexibility of the 
user interface for communicating with the underlying spreadsheet. One of the major 
reasons why spreadsheets have become so prevalent is because of their extreme ease-of-
use, particularly with regard to rapid prototyping of ideas. To diminish this ease-of-use 
and flexibility would undermine the use of the spreadsheet format. 
 
However, the ESP, by definition, retains that flexibility for the appropriate users in the 
organisation (namely the designated experts) by providing them with complete access to 
the underlying spreadsheets (albeit through a secure content-management layer). They 
can prototype, manipulate, and test the spreadsheets in the normal manner. By contrast, 
the normal end-users, who, in order to minimize operating risk, do not have access to the 
underlying spreadsheets, are provided with non-programmable Graphical-User-Interfaces 
(GUIs) which enable them to pass data in to the spreadsheet, perform the desired 
calculations, and retrieve the results back.  For maximum flexibility, these interfaces can 
be generic. For example, they may comprise a simple suite of data-entry grids which map 
on to the corresponding “inputs worksheet(s)” of the underlying spreadsheet, plus a 
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corresponding suite of output data fields mapped on to the respective “outputs 
worksheet(s)” of the underlying spreadsheet. Alternatively, for well-established 
spreadsheet models (i.e. those which are used as deployed “applications” rather than 
prototyping scratchpads), the GUI’s can be customised to reflect the model-specific input 
and output fields (thereby facilitating the use of field-wise validation technology built-in 
to the web application interface mentioned earlier, thereby further minimising spreadsheet 
risk). 
 
With ESP’s implicit separation between the data and the spreadsheets, data can be fed to 
and from the spreadsheets in a variety of ways in addition to the generic (or customized) 
user GUIs discussed above. For example, it is straightforward to automatically populate 
the spreadsheets via links to the company’s existing banking systems and data sources.  
This eliminates the spreadsheet risk associated with manual “double-entry” and/or “copy-
and-paste” of data from the data sources into the spreadsheets. 
 
The outputs are similarly flexible.  They can be displayed to the user, exported to a 
variety of formats, or used to re-populate a banking system, database, or data warehouse 
(with the inherent advantages of consolidated reports, etc).  
 
2.5 Possible usage scenarios 
 
The ESP can accommodate any spreadsheet for any purpose. For example, in a typical 
Basic Mode usage scenario, it would simply be employed as a secure spreadsheet 
management system where users are all, by definition, “superusers” i.e. they use the 
spreadsheets by first downloading them from the central store, manipulate them for their 
present purpose, then upload them again for safe keeping (plus archiving and version 
control, etc). Even this basic usage scenario dramatically reduces spreadsheet risk by 
eliminating the proliferation of models scattered across users’ desktops. However, it does 
not take advantage of the full capabilities of ESP in Advanced Mode. By contrast, the 
example discussed below in Section 3, maximally illustrates the use of the ESP as a 
secure and robust computational engine, in addition to its spreadsheet-management role. 
 
2.6 Domain and Mechanical errors 
 
Ultimately the weak link in the chain is with the superusers. Domain (i.e. incorrect 
specification) and/or mechanical (i.e. incorrect implementation) errors introduced by 
them (unintentionally or otherwise) into the underlying spreadsheets can adversely affect 
the computations. However, ESP assists in these areas too.  
 
Specialisation 
 
As discussed in the example presented in Section 3, ESP enables applications to be 
developed such that only the core business logic is programmed in the spreadsheet by the 
business analyst. All other aspects (e.g. data handling, numerical algorithms, etc) can be 
embodied within the ESP computational framework, which can be independently tested 
and qualified as fit-for-use. In this way, the business analysts only need to “program” (i.e. 
build spreadsheets) in their areas of expertise (i.e. business logic), thereby minimising the 
chance of them introducing errors outside of their area of core specialisation. In this way, 
ESP still allows business users to create their own applications (i.e., spreadsheets 
encompassing business logic) and, therefore, “avoid much of the IT bottleneck” [Gartner, 
2006] that would be incurred with software development. 
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Testability 
 
However, errors do occur, and they can only be reliably identified and removed through a 
rigorous testing process. ESP provides for this in a systematic way. Since the data layer is 
separated from the spreadsheet core, it is straightforward to establish a set of “standard” 
tests comprising a collection of input/output data sets which have been agreed and signed-
off as being valid and correct. Thereafter, whenever a spreadsheet is modified by a 
superuser, the policy can be imposed that the spreadsheet can only “go live” when it has 
successfully passed the battery of standard tests. Moreover, as discussed in Section 3, for 
any calculations involving pseudo-random numbers, the issue of testability becomes more 
severe. ESP enables full control of the pseudo-random “seeds” such that input/output data 
sets can be fully replicated (in contrast, for example, to Excel, which does not allow such 
control). 
 
Spreadsheet Audit Trail 
 
In the event that the effects of domain and/or mechanical errors do creep in to the core 
spreadsheets, the auditability inherent to ESP can assist in resolving the issue. All 
modifications to the spreadsheet models are logged (with user ID's of those making the 
modifications) by the ESP content-management system. Moreover, any time a 
spreadsheet model is used by the system at runtime, a copy is automatically made and 
archived on the server against the given usage instance, thereby providing a secure 
electronic audit trail back to the actual model used, and the ID of the superuser who last 
modified the model. It would require collusion between the superuser, database 
administrator, system administrator, security officer, and network administrator to tamper 
with this audit-trail. 
 
3. EXAMPLE APPLICATION: MONTE CARLO SIMULATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Monte Carlo simulation is a well-established technique for analysing credit risk. As 
illustrated in Figure 2, the basic idea is to construct a (typically time-domain) cashflow 
model which captures the logic of the given deal, drive this model “into the future” with a 
set of randomised macro-economic scenarios (albeit with historically-imposed 
correlations between the variables), then perform the risk analyses on the outputs 
generated from all of the scenarios. The modelling process can be complex (e.g. if 
analysing a complicated energy-generation deal or a large commercial real estate deal 
with many properties and related securities) and the computational process can be 
numerically intensive, especially if globally-linked economies have to be included (e.g. 
with hundreds of interacting macro-economic variables from many different geographies) 
over long lifetimes (e.g. twenty-year deal lifecycles). 
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Figure 2. The basic principle of Monte Carlo simulation for analysing credit risk is illustrated. The simulation 
framework (macro-economic scenario generation and data analysis) is common to all asset-classes, and the 
cashflow model is tailored to a specific asset class (e.g. Investment Real Estate, Project Finance, etc., as 
shown) or indeed, to an individual deal.  
 
3.2 Spreadsheet or “black box”? 
 
A central issue faced by banks when constructing such Monte Carlo simulations is that 
the cashflow models are invariably constructed in a spreadsheet format (typically 
Microsoft Excel) either by their own business analysts (whose programming capabilities 
extend only to Excel), or by the banks’ clients (or other external stakeholders in the deal) 
who present the Excel cashflow model as part of the deal “documentation”. Under these 
(highly typical) circumstances, there are essentially two options available for performing 
the Monte Carlo simulation: i) the cashflow model is retained in Excel, and the rest of the 
simulation framework is built in Excel and/or Visual-Basic-for-Applications (VBA) “add-
ins” etc; or ii) the cashflow model is re-written (by a software developer) in a different 
language (e.g. C++ etc) and then integrated into a non-spreadsheet-based simulation 
framework.  
 
The first option—to build the entire simulation framework in Excel around the cashflow 
model—has the disadvantage of potentially incurring severe spreadsheet risk – not least 
because the programming challenge to construct a mathematically-consistent and 
numerically-robust Monte Carlo simulation framework is decidedly non-trivial, beyond 
the skills of typical business analysts. Moreover, once such a framework has been built in 
spreadsheet form, it is highly-susceptible to the familiar forms of spreadsheet risk since 
the spreadsheet will, by its very nature, be large and complex, and thus vulnerable to the 
introduction of errors (inadvertent or otherwise). 
 
The latter option, i.e. to translate the Excel cashflow model into another programming 
language (for further integration into a non-spreadsheet simulation framework) has the 
severe disadvantage that the underlying model can no longer be manipulated by the 
business analyst. The model has become the proverbial “black box”, and all changes have 
to be implemented by a software developer.  
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3.3 The ESP solution 
 
Using ESP in Advanced Mode, the advantages of both options can be realised, and the 
disadvantages of each eliminated. Specifically, as illustrated in Figure 3, ESP 
incorporates a code layer which enables the spreadsheet to be embedded within a robust 
computational engine (written in C++) which communicates with an auto-spawned 
session of the spreadsheet application (Microsoft Excel) via a shared-memory interface.  
 
 
 
Figure 3. ESP Advanced Mode. The auto-spawned spreadsheet session is embedded within a (C++ coded) 
computational framework via shared-memory, with XML-based input/output data feeds to/from the 
Application Layer via queued-messaging.  
 
Under this arrangement, various aspects of spreadsheet risk are eliminated. For example 
with specific regard to the sample application presented: 
 
1. Complex, numerically-intensive Monte Carlo calculations are not subjected to the 
risk of being programmed into the spreadsheet by business analysts. Only the core 
deal logic is programmed in Excel by the business analyst. 
 
2. Complex numerical method algorithms (e.g. matrix computations, central to many 
financial applications) are not subjected to the risk of being programmed in Excel (or 
VBA). Rather, best-of-breed compiled libraries (such as LAPACK for matrix 
computations) can be linked in via the ESP Advanced Mode interface. 
 
3. In the specific case of Monte Carlo simulation, the use of pseudo-random numbers is 
central to the technique. In Excel, the programmer has no control over the “seed” of 
the pseudo-random number generator. Hence, it is impossible to replicate the outputs 
for a given set of inputs e.g. during the testing phase of the simulator. By contrast, 
under ESP, non-Excel-based pseudo-random number generators can be employed. 
These have the benefit of providing full control over the “seed”, so that input/output 
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replication can be realised for test cases. This eliminates the significant risk 
associated with not being able to properly test the simulator before deployment. 
 
4. Since the ESP computational and data management framework is separate from the 
Excel application, proper runtime monitoring can be invoked. For example, if the 
spawned Excel session “hangs” (unfortunately, an all-to common occurrence, 
especially for large computations), the ESP framework can detect this, and, if 
necessary, shut-down the spreadsheet session, and inform the user that the 
computation has not proceeded successfully. This eliminates the operating risk 
associated with accepting the results from possibly incomplete spreadsheet 
computations. 
 
5. Spreadsheet applications are notoriously slow at computation compared with 
compiled code. This is particularly evident when attempting to construct complex 
Monte Carlo simulations in Excel. By contrast, under the ESP computational 
framework, where the bulk of the numerically-intensive computations are performed 
in the compiled C++ code and only the deal logic remains in Excel, the speed of 
computation can be optimized. For example, on a Monte Carlo simulation of a large 
commercial real estate deal on high-end PC hardware, the ESP simulation framework 
is typically hundreds of times faster than the same simulation programmed in Excel, 
operating on the same Excel deal logic. By providing such performance advantages, 
the risks associated with the users’ temptation to “run just a few Monte Carlo 
iterations” (i.e. to speed-up the Excel-based simulations) is mitigated. This can be 
significant, especially when calculating Probability-of-Default (PD) and Loss-Given-
Default (LGD) for Basel II, where statistically-significant results can only be 
achieved with large numbers of Monte Carlo iterations (especially for low-risk deals). 
When running fewer iterations, the results can be wholly misleading. 
 
6. With the separation between data and the spreadsheet, ESP enables any important 
parameters (e.g. number of Monte Carlo iterations, discussed in the previous item, 
macro-economic assumptions, centrally-set deal parameters such as “haircuts”, etc) to 
be “locked down” such that the computations are performed consistently across the 
portfolio. 
 
Although we have intentionally presented a complex application example (i.e. involving 
Monte Carlo iterations) to highlight the key benefits of the approach, it should be noted 
that any Excel spreadsheet can be configured for use under ESP Advanced mode. This is 
facilitated in a straightforward manner by the inclusion of an “add-in” (which contains the 
code hooks to the shared-memory interface) plus two specific worksheets, in an agreed 
format, which comprise the list of input and output variables, respectively.  
 
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have presented Risk Integrated's Enterprise Spreadsheet Platform (ESP), our 
approach to the near-elimination of spreadsheet risk in the enterprise computing 
environment. With a complex example application, Monte Carlo simulation, we have 
demonstrated how ESP provides a secure, robust, computational framework, yet with 
spreadsheets remaining at the core, thereby preserving the flexibility demanded by 
business analysts. 
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